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PREFACE

This paper will consider the Ontario Legislature's Select Committee on
the Ombudsman, first established on July 15, 1976. Although the focus of the
paper will be Ontario's Select Committee, passing reference will also be made
to parliamentary committees which perform similar functions in other
jurisdictions, most notably Great Britain and Israel. I
Although much has been written about the Ombudsman worldwide, there
is, perhaps surprisingly, a dearth of material dealing with parliamentary committees that consider the Ombudsman's work. In fact, I have been unable to
find even one published book or article devoted entirely to the subject,
although Gregory and Hutchesson have considered the British Committee in
two chapters of their book. 2 Of necessity, then, this paper relies heavily upon
original source material, namely the comments contained in the nine Reports
of the Select Committee on the Ombudsman that to date have been tabled in
the Ontario Legislature.
II. BACKGROUND
On June 27, 1975, Bill 86, entitled An Act to provide for an Ombudsman
to investigate Administrative Decisions and Acts of Officials of the Government of Ontario and its Agencies, 3 received third reading in the Ontario
Legislature. It was during debate of the Bill that mention was first made of the
possibility of establishing a legislative committee on the Ombudsman. Mr..
Patrick Reid 4 thought there should be a "mechanism so that we [the
Assembly] can debate the report of the Ombudsman, because in the final
analysis it is going to5 be public opinion and the glare of publicity that may effect some changes."
Mr. James Renwick, Q.C., MPP, 6 who was ultimately to become the first
Chairman of the Select Committee on the Ombudsman, felt strongly that the
Ombudsman was restricted by the oath of office and secrecy to a formal relationship with the Assembly, and that members "will have little, if any, opportunity to question him about any matters" since "he will7not, except in accordance with subsection [13](2), disclose any information."
'At the outset I ought to declare my interest in the subject. From the establishment
of the Committee to the present, I have, from time to time, appeared on behalf of the
Ombudsman as Counsel before the Committee. As such, I am intimately acquainted
with the work of the Committee, and have my own views with respect to the
Committee's strengths and weaknesses, and its advantages and disadvantages to the Office of
the Ombudsman.
2
Gregory, R., Hutchesson, P., The Parliamentary Ombudsman: A Study in the
Control of Administrative Action (London: Allen and Unwin, 1975). Since the writing
of this paper, the following article has been published: Gregory, R., The Select Committee on the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, 1967-1980 (1982),
Public Law, Spring 1982.
3
29th Leg. Ont., 5th sess.
4Liberal/Labour - Rainy River.
5
Leg. of Ont. Deb. June 10, 1975, at 2844.
6NDP - Riverdale.
7Supra note 5, at 2820. The Ombudsman Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 325, s. 13. The 1975
Act, which has not been amended, is now cited as the Ombudsman Act, R.S.O. 1980,
c. 325. Section 13 states:
(1) Before commencing the duties of his office, the Ombudsman shall take an
oath, to be administered by the Speaker of the Assembly, that he will faithfully and
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To meet this problem, Mr. Renwick proposed that the Ombudsman
report "to a select committee of this assembly and the select committee [pick]
up where [he] leaves off." 8 The Committee should "have the rules settled and
promulgated for the time when the Ombudsman ... takes over," and then
"continue to sit as a Selective Committee indefinitely." 9 In this way, Mr. Renwick felt it could, "in consultation with the Ombudsman," carry through "on
the criticism of whatever departments of Government ... deserve that
criticism for maladministration." 10
The Honourable John Clement, Q.C., then Attorney General, agreed
with these recommendations, and remarked that they could form the
backbone of the creation of a committee.
On October 29, 1975, a Select Committee on Guidelines for the Ombudsman was established under the chairmanship of Mr. Vernon Singer, Q.C.
It was Mr. Singer who, in 1965, had introduced a private member's bill calling
for the appointment of a Parliamentary Commissioner to investigate administrative decisions and acts of officials of the Government of Ontario and
its agencies, and to define that Commissioner's powers and duties. Over the
next nine years, Mr. Singer was to introduce nine similar bills calling for the
appointment of a Parliamentary Commissioner or Ombudsman.
Section 16(1) of the Ombudsman Act provides that, "the Assembly may
make general rules for the guidance of the Ombudsman in the exercise of his
functions under this Act."
The terms of reference of the Singer Committee were "to consider and set
out general rules and guidelines for the guidance of the Ombudsman." 12 Ontario's first Ombudsman, Arthur Maloney, Q.C., was not sworn in until October 30, 1975, the day following the establishment of the Committee. The
Committee completed its work quickly, and issued a report on December 11,
1975.
The Singer Committee recommended that certain minor rules be adopted,
but deferred any delineation of general rules for the creation of a permanent
committee of the Legislature, which it recommended be immediately established to review:
(a) the Ombudsman's Reports;
(b) the Ombudsman's estimates; and
(c) the actions, or lack thereof, taken by those persons referred to in the Ombudsman's Report. 13
The Singer report has not been enacted by the Legislature.
impartially exercise the functions of his office and that he will not, except in
accordance with subsection (2), disclose any information received by him as Ombudsman.
(2) The Ombudsman may disclose in any report made by him under this Act
such matters as in his opinion ought to be disclosed in order to establish grounds
for his conclusions and recommendations.
8
Id.at 2821.
9
Leg. of Ont. Deb. June 19, 1975, at 3153.
10
Supra note 5, at 2821.
I Then Liberal Member of the Provincial Legislature for Downsview.
12 Leg. of Ont. Deb. Dec. 11, 1975, at 1544.
13Id.at 1545.
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III. ESTABLISHMENT
Whether a permanent committee would have been established in the normal course of events is a moot point. On July 15, 1976, on a motion by
Premier William Davis seconded by the Leader of the Opposition, Stuart
Smith, the predecessor of the current Select Committee on the Ombudsman
was appointed, "to review from time to time the reports of the Ombudsman as
they become available .... ,"14The striking of the Committee was precipitated
by the Ombudsman's presentation of a report to the Assembly pursuant to section 22(4) of the Ombudsman Act. Is
The Report of the Opinion of the Ombudsman, His Reasons Therefor
and Recommendations Concerning the North Pickering Project to the
Honourable linisterof Housing of Ontario was highly critical of the methods
employed by the Ministry of Housing and its agents in acquiring land in the
North Pickering Project area. It marked the first time that the head of an Ontario governmental organization had declined to accept the Ombudsman's
opinions and recommendations, and the first time that the Ombudsman had
seen fit to proceed to the Premier and the Assembly. The seriousness of the
matter clearly demanded evaluation and response by the Assembly, yet no
vehicle existed for the detailed consideration of the Ombudsman's report and
of the Ministry's response. A small committee was the obvious forum for the
House to deal with the issue and to serve generally as the Assembly's
mechanism for maintaining communication with the Office of the Ombudsman. 16
When Mr. Maloney's report, dated June 22, 1976, was rejected by the
Minister of Housing, the Honourable John Rhodes, the Ombudsman sent a
copy of his report to the Premier urging him to accept the opinions and recommendations contained therein. Several meetings followed between the Premier
and the Ombudsman in an attempt to find a common ground to deal with the
report. During these discussions, it was agreed between the Premier and Mr.
Maloney that a Select Committee of the Legislature, representing all of the
political parties in the same proportions as they were represented in the House,
should be appointed to consider the Ombudsman's report and the Minister's
response. The first Select Committee on the Ombudsman accordingly was
comprised of eight members, whose party affiliations were as follows: three
Conservatives, three New Democrats and two Liberals. The party leaders
agreed that the Committee ought to be chaired by a member of the New
Democrat opposition, as Ontario had a minority government. As a result,
James A. Renwick, Q.C. 17 was appointed first Committee chairman. Mr. Renwick had played a major role in the debates concerning Bill 86, when the Ombudsman Bill was in Committee stage.
14Journalsof the LegislativeAssembly of the Province of Ontario, 30th Leg. Ont.,
3d sess. at 146.
15Section 22(4). If within a reasonable time after the report is made no action is
taken which seems to the Ombudsman to be adequate and appropriate, the Ombudsman, in his discretion, after considering the comments, if any, made by or on
behalf of any governmental organization affected, may send a copy of the report and
recommendations to the Premier, and may thereafter make such report to the Assembly
on the matter as he thinks fit.
16White, G., Ontario'sSelect Committee on the Ombudsman (1982), 50 The Table
(Journal of the Society of the Clerks-at-the Table in Commonwealth Parliaments).
17M.P.P. for Riverdale.
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IV. TERMS OF REFERENCE AND ORGANIZATION
The precise terms of the Order of Reference made by the Assembly on
July 15, 1976 were as follows: Ordered,
[T]hat a Select Committee of this House be appointed to review from time to time
the reports of the Ombudsman as they become available, to report thereon to the
Legislature, and to make such recommendations as the Committee deems appropriate; reports and recommendations of the Committee to be placed on the
Order Paper for discussion after presentation.
And that the Select Committee have authority to sit during recesses and the interval between Sessions and have power to employ such staff as it deems necessary
and to call for persons, papers and things and to examine witnesses under oath,
and the Assembly doth command and compel the attendance before the said Select
Committee of such persons and the production of such papers and things as the
Committee may deem necessary for any of its proceedings and deliberations for
which the Honourable the Speaker may issue his warrant or warrants. 18
The United Kingdom, the only other English-speaking jurisdiction with a
committee expressly established to consider Ombudsman Reports, appointed
its Select Committee on the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration
in November, 1967.19 Its terms of reference were, "to examine the Reports laid
before the House by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, and
matters in connection therewith," and subsequently to report thereon to the
House of Commons.
Another parliamentary committee, created solely to consider Ombudsman Reports, is the State Control Committee of the Israeli Knesset. It is
within the State Comptroller Law itself that the duties of the Comptroller IOmbudsman vis-d-vis the Knesset and the State Control Committee are
set forth, along with the functions of the Committee. The pertinent sections
are reproduced in their entirety:
Section 6 The Comptroller shall carry on his activities in contact with the State
Control Committee of the Knesset and shall report to the Committee on his activities whenever he thinks fit or is required to do so by the Committee.
Section 46(a) The Commissioner shall each year submit to the Knesset, at the
beginning of its session, a report on his activities, containing a general survey and
an account of the handling of selected complaints;
Section 46(c) When a report has been tabled in the Knesset, the Committee shall
consider it and shall submit to the Knesset its conclusions and proposals for
approval.

18Supranote 14.
9
It is important to note that all complaints to the Parliamentary Commissioner for
Administration in Great Britain must be referred by a Member of Parliament. Other
than the French Mediateur, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration in
Northern Ireland and the Commissioners for Local Administration in England,
Scotland and Wales, all other classical Ombudsman offices receive complaints directly
from the complainant. Provisions in the enabling legislation for the Commissioners for
Local Administration permit the Commissioner's to act on complaints received 'directly'
from the public under certain circumstances such as a member of the local authority has
refused to refer the complaint to the Local Ombudsman or an unreasonable delay has
passed since the request to refer the complaint to the Commissioner was tendered by the
complainant. This important difference in the procedure of approaching the Ombudsman may account for the almost immediate appointment of the British Select Committee on the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration. The role of the British
Parliamentary Commissioner might be considered to be more intimately involved with
the Parliament as a whole and with the role of individual Members of Parliament.
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The State Control Committee was first appointed early in 1974. Prior to

that, functions connected with the State Comptroller had been performed by
the Finance Committee of the Knesset, along with its many other tasks. While
Ontario, Israel and the United Kingdom are the only jurisdictions with
parliamentary committees appointed exclusively to consider Ombudsman
Reports, there are many other jurisdictions worldwide, where existing committees with a broader mandate consider, among their many other tasks, the work
of the Ombudsman. For example, the Justice Committee for Parliament of
Denmark, which performs functions similar to the Standing Committee on
Administration of Justice of Ontario, has the authority to receive and consider
the annual report of the Ombudsman and to report thereon to Parliament.
Similar roles are performed in Sweden, Finland, Austria, Alberta and two of
the American states. The Swedish, Finnish and Austrian Committees on the
Constitution consider the Ombudsman's Annual Reports and comment on
them in Parliament. In Alberta, the Select Committee on Legislative Offices
considers the Reports of the Ombudsman, the Auditor General and the Chief
Electorial Officer. The Select Committee in Alberta reviews the salary of the
Ombudsman on an annual basis. In Hawaii and Iowa, the Finance Committee
and the Legislative Service Committee respectively act as intermediaries between the Ombudsman and the Legislative Assembly. In other jurisdictions,
such as the state of Rheinland-Palatinate in the Federal Republic of Germany
and the City of Rotterdam, Netherlands, the Ombudsman is the Chairman of
the Petitions Committee with case reports being considered by those bodies.
Ontario's Select Committee on the Ombudsman convened for the first
time on July 19, 1976. Notwithstanding that three of the eight members, including the Committee Chairman, were lawyers, the Committee saw fit at one
of its first organizational meetings to appoint Mr. John P. Bell, of the law firm
Shibley, Righton and McCutcheon, as its counsel, to advise and assist the
Committee on matters relevant to its terms of reference. Although questions
have been raised from time to time by various Committee members over the
past six years concerning the necessity of legal counsel, Mr. Bell continues to
act as counsel to the Committee. The Committee staff also includes a clerk and
a secretary.
The Select Committee met for twelve sessions during the period commencing July 19, 1976 and ending October 1st of that year. The majority of
these sessions were taken up by a consideration of the Ombudsman's report respecting the North Pickering Project and the Minister of Housing's response.
The specifics of the case are complex and not germane to this account,
although the "North Pickering affair" was important for the Committee in
that it established the Committee's basic approach to all subsequent work and
its attitude to the Ombudsman.
On October 15, 1976, Committee Chairman Renwick tabled before the
Legislature the First Report20 of the Select Committee on the Ombudsman.
For obvious reasons, the largest part of the report, namely Part IV, considered
the North PickeringReport and response. Again, although the details of the
case are not important, it is worth noting that it was during the hearings held
20

Ont., First Report of the Select Committee on the Ombudsman (1976)
[hereinafter Committee].
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before the Committee that a Committee member suggested that the Ombudsman and the Minister of Housing ought to try to find a solution to the impasse that had developed. As a result of this suggestion, the Minister and the
Ombudsman met privately and arrived at an agreement which was subsequently
ratified by the Select Committee with minor variations. The terms of the agreement were also acceptable to counsel for five land acquisition agents who had
brought an application to judicially review certain aspects of the Ombudsman's investigation and subsequent report.
Since the Committee sees itself as the catalyst which led to the agreement
concluded between the Ombudsman and the then Minister of Housing, the
Committee has indicated as recently as December, 1981, when its Ninth Report
was tabled, that it "intends to regularly and diligently pursue with the Ombudsman and others the progress of his efforts in bringing this matter to an appropriate conclusion." 21
In its FirstReport, the Committee also made reference to its predecessor,
the Select Committee on Guidelines, referred to earlier in this paper. The
Committee expressed its opinion that the Legislature intended it to be the successor of the first Select Committee, "to undertake the task of gaining a
'greater on-going experience' in respect of the office and function of the Ombudsman and thereafter to recommend to the Legislature from time to time,
general rules for the guidance of the Ombudsman in the exercise of his
22
function."
In order that it could discharge the full range of responsibilities, which it
viewed as being intended by the Legislature, the Committee recommended in
its First Report that its terms of reference be amended on motion in the
Legislature by substituting for the former terms of reference the following:
That, a Select Committee of this House be appointed to review from time to time
the reports of the Ombudsman as they become available, and to formulate from
time to time, as the Committee deems necessary, pursuant to Section 16(1) of The
Ombudsman Act, 1975, general rules for the guidance of the Ombudsman in the
exercise of his functions under The Ombudsman Act, to report thereon to the
Legislature, and to make such recommendations as the Committee deems appropriate; reports and recommendations of 23the Committee to be placed on the
order paper for discussion after presentation.
On December 16, 1976, the Legislative Assembly ordered that the terms
of reference of the Committee be amended to give the Committee authority to
formulate such general rules. Section 16 of the Ombudsman Act provides for
the Assembly to make such rules which, when made, are deemed by the Act to
be regulations within the meaning of the Regulations Act. 2 4 In essence, the
Assembly delegated unto the Committee the authority rules for consideration
by the House. The Committee's interpretation of its rule-formulating term of
reference has led to serious problems in the Committee's relationship with the
Ombudsman, about which more shall be said later.

Ninth Report of the Select Committee on the Ombudsman (1981) at 25.
Supra note 20, at 2.

21 Ont.,
22

2
3Id.
24

at 3.

R.S.O. 1980, c. 446.
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Although the precise wording of the Committee's Order of Reference has
varied somewhat over the years, its principal tasks have always been to review
the Reports of the Ombudsman, to formulate general rules for the guidance of
the Ombudsman, and to report to the Legislature. On May 29, 1980, however,
the Order of Reference of the Select Committee was further amended to include a function that had nothing whatsoever to do with the work of the Ombudsman. It was on that date that the Legislative Assembly passed a resolution
put forward by former Chairman Renwick in the following terms:
That this Assembly request the Select Committee on the Ombudsman to consult
with the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Amnesty International
and the International Commission of Jurists and others, if advisable, with a view
to reporting to this Assembly on ways in which this Assembly may act25to make its
voice heard against political killings, imprisonment, terror and torture.
Although, in proposing the resolution, Mr. Renwick recognized that this
new term was foreign to the routine work of the Committee, the Assembly acceded to his submission so that the establishment of a new Committee with this
mandate (which would have been unlikely) became unnecessary. Since the
Committee was unable to complete its task before the general election held in
the spring of 1981, it obtained the approval of the Legislature on October 13th
of that year to finish the work of its predecessor. In its Ninth Report, the Committee indicated that it intended to complete the matter and report to the
Legislature before the end of the Spring 1982 sitting.
Following that general election which, for the first time since the establishment of the Ombudsman's office, saw a Conservative majority elected, the
Committee was reappointed on July 2, 1981. The current Select Committee on
the Ombudsman is composed of twelve members, with the three political parties represented roughly in proportion to their numbers in the House. Thus,
the Progressive Conservative Party, which forms the Government, has seven
seats, while the official opposition, the Liberal Party, has three seats and the
New Democratic Party, two. The present Chairman, for the first time since the
establishment of the Committee, is a member of the Government party, the
Vice-Chairman being a member of the Official Opposition.
For all intents and purposes, the Select Committee on the Ombudsman is
a permanent one, despite the fact that in Ontario a "select"
committee is
26
usually considered to be a special, temporary committee.
V.

PROCEDURE

Section 12 of the Ombudsman Act requires the Ombudsman to report annually upon the affairs of his office. The first Ombudsman determined that
this provision should be regarded as a minimum requirement and that both the
members of the public and the Legislature would be better served if reports
were issued on a semi-annual basis. The present Ombudsman, the Honourable
Donald Morand, is content to report on an annual basis.
2

1 Journalsof the LegislativeAssembly of the Province of Ontario, 31st Leg. Ont.,
4th sess. at 116.
26 For an overview of the Committee system, see White, G., Committees in the Ontario Legislature(1980), 61 The Parliamentarian 9 at 9-23. For a comparison of Standing and Select Committees, see Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Witnesses
before Legislative Committees (1981).
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Four types of matters are normally included in the annual reports:
(1) an analysis of performance and changes at the Office of the Ombudsman;
(2) a summary of cases, both typical and significant, illustrative of the type of
work performed by the office;
(3) a summary of all "recommendation denied" cases - that is, instances
where the governmental organization has either rejected the Ombudsman's
report or failed to take action which the Ombudsman felt was adequate
and appropriate in response to the Ombudsman's report following his investigation of a case; and
(4) charts containing all cases outstanding since the inception of the office,
where either a recommendation was denied or the Ombudsman recommended that a practice be altered or a law reconsidered.
The Committee concentrates its work on these four areas, with particular emphasis on the very few "recommendation denied" cases summarized annually.
It should perhaps be clarified that the Ombudsman's North Pickering
Report was the only occasion, from the date of establishment of the office,
that the Ombudsman saw fit to make a special report to the Assembly pursuant to section 22(4) of the Act. Rather than making a number of special
reports on individual cases where a governmental organization has resisted the
Ombudsman's recommendation, both Mr. Maloney and Mr. Morand have
determined that, absent a degree of urgency, the better course would be to include detailed summaries of such cases in the annual report.
Once the Ombudsman's report is received by the Speaker, it stands referred to the Committee. After reading the report, Committee counsel then
reviews the contents of the general section of the report, as well as that year's
"recommendation denied" cases, with relevant members of the Ombudsman's
staff and with officials of the governmental organizations involved. Relevant
documentation is obtained, indexed by counsel, and an agenda is set. Loose
leaf binders are prepared containing the agenda and documentation. Since the
Ombudsman has made it a practice to make the case summaries anonymous,
all documents have names of complainants, public servants and other identifying references removed. No one associated with the Committee knows the
complainant's identity, unless the complainant makes himself known to the
Committee.
The actual Committee meetings are among the most formal any held by
Ontario legislative committees. In large measure, this reflects the Committee's
non-partisan approach and its desire to maintain a neutral stance between the
Ombudsman and the Government. Even so, witnesses are not normally sworn
in, and the preference has been for common sense flexibility rather than for
restrictive, court-like rules of evidence. Most Committee meetings are open to
the public and the press, with the exception of all meetings at which reports are
being drafted or considered, and occasional instances when the Committee
deems it best to take evidence in camera.
Since the "recommendation denied" cases reviewed by the Committee are
usually quite complex, with many technical and legal issues, Committee
counsel normally leads the evidence, beginning with the Ombudsman's report
of the investigation and the opinions expressed therein, with a view to bringing
out all the pertinent facts for the Committee members. Of course, members
regularly ask their own questions to clarify matters raised by counsel or pursue
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their own lines of inquiry, generally unimpeded by counsel. However, questioning of both Ombudsman staff and government officials is rigorous and
pointed, so that both "sides" must be prepared to convince the Committee
that their assessment and the actions that they have taken are well documented
and are justifiable. Ombudsman personnel are seated beside the officials
representing the governmental organization at a witness table facing the Committee, rather than beside the Chairman.
The procedure followed by Ontario's Select Committee on the Ombudsman closely parallels that pursued by the United Kingdom's Select Committee on the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration. One significant difference, however, is that the British Committee lacks the staff and
resources of our own, and particularly is without the assistance of legal
counsel. As a result, the Committee relies heavily on the resources of the
Parliamentary Commissioner and his office to brief it respecting the nature
and substance of the complaints and the manner in which they have been investigated. A further difference has been the British Committee's failure to exercise its powers to admit the press and public to its sittings.
The procedure at Israel's State Control Committee is somewhat different.
The Ombudsman, who is seated to the right of the Chairman at the head of the
table, opens with a short statement. Usually the cases picked by the Committee
are those where the body complained of has not taken sufficient corrective
measures, and its respresentative is then called on to explain this attitude and
to answer questions from members of the Committee. The Ombudsman, if he
so chooses, closes the session with his reactions to the statements made and his
assessment of the situation. As in Ontario, at a later session the Committee
discusses and votes on its conclusions and recommendations with regard to the
report and those sections it has debated.
VI. ONUS AND BURDEN OF PROOF BEFORE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON A "RECOMMENDATION DENIED" CASE
In considering the North Pickering Report and the accompanying
response before the Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the
Ombudsman and Minister of Housing, the Committee, of necessity, grappled
with some basic issues respecting its role in the "recommendation denied"
case: was the Select Committee intended to investigate anew the complaint investigated and reported upon by the Ombudsman? Like the British Committee, its Ontario counterpart decided that this could not have been the intention
of the Legislature, nor did the Committee have the time or resources to properly
discharge this mammoth undertaking. Was the Committee "the Ombudsman
for the Ombudsman," or a "Court of Appeal" from opinions expressed by
the Ombudsman in "recommendation denied" reports? Again, like its English
cousin, the Committee doubted that this was its legitimate role. However,
nowhere in its FirstReport did it address this issue.
Since there were no "recommendation denied" cases in the FirstAnnual
Report of the Ombudsman, 1975-1976, the Committee likewise did not deal
with the question in its SecondReport, 1977.27
27Ont.,

Second Report of the Select Committee on the Ombudsman (1977).
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In the Ombudsman's Second Report, Mr. Maloney referred to four
recommendations which had been made by him pursuant to section 22(3) of
the Ombudsman Act 28 and which, for various reasons, had been rejected by
the governmental organizations in question. However, in none of the cases did
the Ombudsman exercise his discretion to send a copy of his report and recommendation to the Premier, and thereafter to the Assembly. Instead, the Ombudsman included an account of the cases in detail in his Second Report. In
each case, the Ombudsman confirmed before the Committee that, notwithstanding the responses of each governmental organization, he continued
to support his recommendations fully before the Committee. It was the Committee's view that the Ombudsman had, in effect, requested that the Committee in each case support his recommendation, and so report to the Legislature
for implementation. In its Third Report, also tabled in 1977, the Select Committee expressed its view that, by referring the recommendations directly to the
Legislature in his Second Report, while continuing to seek the relief in accordance with his recommendations, the Ombudsman had eliminated the step to
the Premier's office contemplated by section 22(4) of the Act. The Committee
stated its role as follows:
This Committee will, when the circumstances warrant, give full support to a
recommendation made by the Ombudsman rejected by a governmental organization. However, the Committee in those situations will require that the Ombudsman has, in every respect, carried out the necessary provisions of the statute.
To do less would be to expose the Ombudsman to criticism
and might undermine
the confidence which the public must have in his office. 29
As a result, the Committee determined that it would not make any recommendations to the Legislature and that the recommendations made by the Ombudsman in each of the four cases be in some way implemented by the governmental organizations in question. However, the Committee did proceed to
comment further on the cases individually, making such recommendations as
it deemed appropriate, on the basis that "it would not be fulfilling its obligation to the Legislature30and to the people of the Province of Ontario if it failed
to comment further."
28 Section 22(3). If in any case to which this section applies the Ombudsman is of
opinion,
(a) that the matter should be referred to the appropriate authority for further consideration;
(b) that the omission should be rectified;
(c) that the decision or recommendation should be cancelled or varied;
(d) that any practice on which the decision, recommendation, act or omission was
based should be altered;
(e) that any law on which the decision, recommendation, act or omission was based should be reconsidered;
(f) that reasons should have been given for the decision or recommendation; or
(g) that any other steps should be taken,
the Ombudsman shall report his opinion, and his reasons therefor, to the appropriate
governmental organization, and may make such recommendations as he thinks fit and
he may request the governmental organization to notify him, within a specified time, of
the steps, if any, that it proposes to take to give effect to his recommendations and the
Ombudsman shall also send a copy of his report and recommendations to the minister.
29
Ont., Third Report of the Select Committee on the Ombudsman (1977) at 37.
30

Id.
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The Committee has continued to require "scrupulous adherence to the
provisions of the statute, ' 31 notwithstanding section 24 of the Act, which provides, in part, that no proceeding of the Ombudsman is to be held bad for
want of form.
In its Fifth Report, the Committee expanded on its view as to its proper
function in reviewing "recommendation denied" cases:
Accordingly, the Committee will review with the office of the Ombudsman all
phases of the Ombudsman's functions which were exercised in the particular complaint. It will also examine with the governmental organization in question the adequacy and appropriateness of its response. If that response has been less than complete and if the exchange between the Ombudsman and the governmental
organization contemplated by Section 22 of the Ombudsman Act has been less
than thorough, the Committee will inquire into as much detail as it considers
necessary in the circumstances.
When it appears to the Committee that the Ombudsman has complied with the
provisions of the legislation and where the governmental organization's response is
not adequate, appropriate or reasonable to the Committee, it will prima facie support the Ombudsman's recommendation. When the Ombudsman was created in
Ontario, the Legislature intended that a vehicle for the scrutiny of decisions of the
public service would ultimately press the Legislature to redress the consequences of
certain decisions considered by him to be warranted, within the context of the Ombudsman Act. If the Committee chose not to support a recommendation of the
Ombudsman after it had satisfied itself as set out above, it would seriously undermine the effectiveness and credibility of the Ombudsman in the eyes of the people
of the Province of Ontario and the members of the public service. 32
In its Seventh Report, the Committee added that it:
wishes to assure the Legislature that it will continue to investigate exhaustively and
review all aspects of Ombudsman reports before reporting thereon to the
Legislature, particularly on matters of Ombudsman recommendations. This process will ensure that the Legislature, through this Committee, before effectively
approving and adopting a recommendation of the Ombudsman will have fully investigated,
examined and thoroughly reported upon all relevant and appropriate
33
issues.
It is true that, from the very outset, the Committee has taken great pains to
be - and to be seen to be - entirely fair and unbiased in its dealings with the
Ombudsman and with the governmental organizations on "recommendation
denied" cases. The Committee's third chairman, Patrick Lawlor, Q.C.,
described the Committee's stance as one of "weighted neutrality" - that is,
the Committee carefully and objectively weighs the evidence presented to it,
but, without automatically taking the Ombudsman's part in the dispute, tends
to lean towards the Ombudsman's point of view. On the other hand, the Committee has not been afraid of disagreeing with the Ombudsman, and has done
so on a number of occasions, even where the Committee concurs that it was
open for the Ombudsman to reach the conclusions and recommendations
which he did. Moreover, the Committee has, on occasion, made recommendations wider in scope that those originally made by the Ombudsman in his
34
report.
31Supra note
32

27, at 33.
Ont., Fifth Report of the Select Committee on the Ombudsman (1978) at 98-99.
33
Ont., Seventh Report of the Select Committee on the Ombudsman (1979) at III.
34
See, Ont., Eighth Report of the Select Committee on the Ombudsman (1981) at
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The present Clerk of the Committee, Dr. Graham White, has likened the
Committee to a quasi-judicial tribunal or a Royal Commission, in which
evidence is brought out by the staff counsel, and the members reach a decision
favouring the views put forward by the Ombudsman or by the Government.
Despite the high-principled language employed by the Committee in its
Reports with respect to its role in reviewing "recommendation denied" cases,
experience has demonstrated that the Committee has yet to come to grips with
the basic issues of burden of proof when hearing "recommendation denied"
cases. On the other hand, it is fair to say that, while the Committee does not
primafacie support the Ombudsman, it does assiduously attempt to maintain
a neutral stance as between the Ombudsman and the governmental organization. However, should the Committee disagree with the Ombudsman's assessment of the facts or with the Ombudsman's conclusions and recommendations
flowing therefrom, the Committee does not hesitate to say so.35
One must question the wisdom of the Committee in so blithely disagreeing
with the Ombudsman's opinions. No one, least of all the Ombudsman, expects
the Select Committee merely to act as a rubber stamp of Ombudsman Reports
and recommendations. On the other hand, the Ombudsman's opinions are
formed after a careful investigation. He is an expert in matters of administration, surveying approximately five hundred provincial governmental bodies.
As such, surely he is entitled to a greater degree of deference by the Committee. After all, had the Legislature intended the Committee to act as Ombudsman, it could have specified so, as has been done in the Federal Republic
of Germany with the Parliamentary Committee on Petitions.
In a letter dated December 20, 1979 to Mr. Patrick Lawlor, Q.C., former
Chairman of the Select Committee, the present Ombudsman, Mr. Morand, set
forth what he viewed to be the appropriate burden of proof before the
Committee:
Just as I, as a rule, do not criticize a decision reached by a governmental organization if it could reasonably have arrived at such a decision with all the relevant facts
before it, so in my view and with respect, the Committee ought not to substitute its
opinion for mine, unless I could not reasonably have arrived at the conclusion and

recommendation which I have - even if the Committee might have reached a different opinion on the same facts.
In the same letter, Mr. Morand expressed his concern that the Committee,
in failing to support an Ombudsman recommendation, might well have the
unintended effect of undermining the effectiveness and credibility of the office. It may be interpreted by some governmental bodies, with whom the Ombudsman must deal on a regular basis, as a pretext for not taking remedial action at an earlier stage, on the basis that they stand a greater chance of success
if they go to the limit and take their chances before the Committee. Of course,
an Ombudsman cannot function effectively without support and co-operation
from the administrative arm of government.
It is significant that, while Mr. Morand's letter was acknowledged, the
above issues were never addressed, and to date remain unresolved.

35

28-31.

See, e.g., the Committee's consideration of complaint No. 24, supra note 21, at
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Perhaps the most interesting phenomenon, virtually unique to the work of
this Committee, is the non-partisan approach taken by the members in considering the "recommendation denied" cases. In the six years that the Comonly one dissent registered by a
mittee has been in existence, there has been
36
Committee member to a Committee report.
Given the Committee's mandate, the opportunities for direct political
confrontation are clearly not so numerous as in other Committees or in the
House, yet many issues have surfaced in the Committee which, in a different
setting, might well have resulted in bitter, protracted partisan conflict. Dr.
White has observed that the Select Committee on the Ombudsman has,
however, generally been the least partisan committee in the Ontario
Legislature; in most instances, observers would be hard-pressed to identify
members' party affiliations from their remarks in the Committee. This
apolitical approach has been a key element in the Committee's effectiveness.
Prior to the establishment of the Select Committee, Ontario's first Ombudsman considered whether there should be a free vote in the Assembly when
considering the Ombudsman's Reports, especially Reports where a government agency and the Premier had not responded to the Ombudsman's recommendations. Mr. Maloney thought that an advantage of a free vote would be
to underline the fact that the Ombudsman was the agent of the Legislature as a
whole and not of any particular party. He concluded, however, that if the issue
was one on which the Government felt strongly, party solidarity would be enforced and, therefore, the appointment of a Select Committee was a more
workable alternative.
Of course, Mr. Maloney's analysis begs the question as to whether party
solidarity would likewise be required before the Committee on a contentious
political issue. Although the Committee has yet to consider a case with the
political ramifications of the Ombudsman's North Pickering Report, in its
Eighth Report, 1980, the Committee unanimously supported a recommendation of the Ombudsman, which was potentially embarrassing to the government, since it related to his interpretation of a key section of the Workmen's
Compensation Act dealing with assessments for permanent disability. 37 The
Ombudsman's interpretation differed from the Board's.
However, when the Select Committee's Report was debated in the House,
party solidarity was enforced with the result that the Conservative majority in
the House declined to approve and adopt this recommendation of the Committee. The Committee's reaction to the Assembly's rejection of its recommendation will be explored in detail in the next section.
The proceedings of the British Committee on the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration consist entirely of a review of selected cases
referenced in the Commissioner's report with respect to what steps, if any, the
government authority has taken or intends to take to implement redress of the
maladministration, and/or to effect a change in administrative policy in order
to avoid a repetition of similar consequences. Sir Hugh Monro-Lucas-Tooth,
sometime Chairman of the Committee, stated that it was not for him and his
36

at 95.37

The dissent of Larry Grossman, M.P.P., to Recommendation I, supra note 27,
Supra note 34, at 50-55.
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fellow members to "retry" cases or "to review the Commissioner's findings";
rather, the concern of a Select Committee on the Ombudsman should be with:
(a) remedying the aggrieved person ... where the Commissioner found that
injustice.., had not been, or would not be remedied;
(b) the nature of any defect in a department's administrative systems revealed
by the Commissioner;...
(c) the adequacy
of the Commissioner's powers for the performance of his
38
function.
The Committee is generally supportive of the Parliamentary Commissioner, and it certainly has been the exception rather than the rule that the conduct of the Commissioner or his staff has been questioned respecting the
handling of any complaint or the substance of any report. The Committee has
encouraged the Commissioner to take a broader view of his jurisdiction, and
has assisted and reinforced his work.
VII. SELECT COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
LEGISLATURE
As previously mentioned, the Order of Reference of the Select Committee
empowers it to ". . . report. . . to the Legislature, and to make such recommendations as the Committee deems appropriate." 39 Beginning with its Second Report, the Select Committee has included in its final report to the
Legislature, a number of recommendations directed to governmental
organizations subject to the Ombudsman's jurisdiction, the Ombudsman
himself, and the Legislature as a whole. 40
It is fair to say that, while the Ombudsman may not have agreed with
some of the Committee's recommendations, he has nevertheless agreed to implement the recommendations, in most cases even before the Select Committee's report was debated in the House.
Relations between the Committee and the Executive have not always been
so accommodating in terms of response to the Committee's recommendations.
In early 1979, the'Committee thought it necessary to issue a Special Report,
complete with a black-edged "death notice" on the front cover, in order to ensure, "meaningful comment and response by representatives of the Government to whom Committee recommendations are addressed."' 41 The excerpt
from the Introduction of the Report, highlighted on the cover, outlined the
purpose of the Special Report as being:
to focus the Legislature's attention solely on outstanding matters wherein recommendations of either or both of the Ombudsman and this Committee have been ignored or refused. It is the Committee's intention that its recommendations in this
report will be individually debated and voted upon by the Legislature. Only when
38William,

G., The British P.C.A.: Ombudsman or Ombudsmouse? (1973), 35
J. Pol.
45
at
45-69.
3
9Supra note 14.
40 See, e.g., the thirty recommendations summarized by the Committee in Schedule
"A", supra note 27, at 56-63.
41 Ont., Sixth Report of the Select Committee on the Ombudsman (1979) at II. On
this subject see also Gregory, Hutchesson, The ParliamentaryOmbudsman (1975) at
609-10.
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that has been done, will the Ombudsman's function have been completed. Only
when that has been done, will this Committee's Order of Reference have been
fulfilled.

The Committee's Sixth "Special" Report was a reaction to the debate of
the Committee's Fifth Report and recommendations which took place on Nov.
27, 1978. During the period scheduled for debate, no Ministers of the Crown
representing ministries or governmental organizations to whom the Committee
had addressed its recommendations in its Fifth Report were present in the
Legislature, or were represented by any other member, for the purpose of
speaking to the Report generally, or responding to any recommendation
specifically. Following the debate, the Chairman of the Committee, Mr.
Michael Davison, resigned from the Committee to protest what he regarded as
a serious affront not only to the Committee, but also to the institution of the
Ombudsman.
In its Sixth Report, the Committee agreed with Mr. Davison observing
that:
To ignore the Committee's efforts and Reports only serves to demean the concept
of the Ombudsman in Ontario, the role and function of Select Committees of the
Legislature, and the legislative process generally.
Unless our Ombudsman has access, directly or indirectly to the Legislative
Assembly, to seek support for any of his recommendations, he will not be fully effective in his office. Where it is appropriate and where the circumstances so warrant, unless the Legislative Assembly is prepared to give full support to the Ombudsman's recommendations, then it is paying mere lip service to the concept of

the Omthe Ombudsman in Ontario. Without such support of the Legislature,
42
budsman is reduced to a reporter and record-keeper of complaints.

The Committee proceeded in its Sixth Report to make nine recommendations, including two providing that, "the Legislature require the Workmen's
Compensation Board to implement the recommendation of the Ombudsman. .

. . "43

As previously mentioned, it was the Committee's intention that

its nine recommendations be individually voted upon and adopted by the
Legislative Assembly.
The Legislature responded on June 21, 1979 by ordering that the Report
of the Committee of the Whole House, which concurred in the nine recommendations contained in the Committee's Sixth Report, be received and
adopted.
The Committee, in its Seventh Report, remarked that this process had
"elevated the Office of the Ombudsman... to a new level of effectiveness."' 44
The Committee proceeded to express its confidence that a procedure had been
attained, whereby the Ombudsman could attempt to invoke his "ultimate
sanction" in such situations wherein a governmental organization had
neglected or refused to implement a recommendation made by him in one of
his Reports.
During the hearings held in 1979, preceding the issuance of the Committee's Seventh Report, a debate took place as to the legal force of Committee
recommendations adopted by the House. Committee counsel and the new
42

Id.at III-IV.

43

Id. at 15.

44 Supra note 33.
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Committee Chairman, Mr. Lawlor, were of the view that such recommendations were binding upon the Government and its administrative agencies. The
Attorney General, the Honourable R. Roy McMurtry, Q.C., appeared before
the Committee to argue the contrary: that Committee recommendations, even
when endorsed by the House, are in no way legally binding. While I would
have preferred to agree with the Committee, I was forced to agree with the Attorney General, when invited by its Chairman to assist the Committee. It is
clear that, although a resolution of the Legislature may bind in matters relating
to procedures of the House and its committees, the Legislature can only affect
substantive matters
outside its own internal operations by appropriate
45
legislative action.
In its Seventh Report, the Committee went on record as disagreeing with
the position of the Attorney General and argued that, "the issue of the legal
effect of legislative action in this context is by no means clear and
'46
unequivocal."
However, the Report also contains the following observation, which is
rather more important:
The weight in law that an Order of the Legislature adopting a Select Committee's
report and recommendations is, in the Committee's opinion, not the critical issue
in this discussion. That critical issue is best expressed by the Attorney General in a
letter to the Chairman of this Committee dated July 4th, 1979 as to what is 'the
best way to implement recommendations of the Ombudsman and the Select Committee.' Certainly the discussion should not be centred upon the possible consequences of a failure or refusal to implement such recommendations, but upon the
'best way' that the governmental organizations affected thereby are to implement
those recommendations.
The Committee hopes that any governmental organization affected by such a
recommendation adopted by the Legislature, would be loathe not to implement
that recommendation as quickly as possible. If that were not the case it would have
a serious undermining effect on the integrity of the Legislature and the respect
which all governmental organizations must have therefor. Certainly any governmental organization who embarks upon a technical 'word game' with respect to
the legal affect of the legislative action is demonstrating a profound disrespect for
both the concept of47the Ombudsman in the Province of Ontario and the
Legislative Assembly.
The earlier referred-to opinion of the Attorney General was prompted by
a letter from the Chairman of the Workmen's Compensation Board, Mr.
Michael Starr, requesting specific direction from the Honourable Robert G.
Elgie, M.D., Minister of Labour, and the Government as to the Board's position vis-d-vis the Report of the Committee received and adopted by the
Legislature. The Minister of Labour advised the Workmen's Compensation
Board that it, "must be particularly responsive to recommendations of the
Ombudsman that receive the support of the Select Committee on the Ombudsman." Notwithstanding the Attorney General's legal opinion, when Mr.
Starr appeared before the Committee he indicated that the Board was prepared
to comply with the wishes of the Assembly and to implement its recommendations. The Minister of Labour replied in like fashion.
45See May, Erskine, ParliamentaryPractice (19th ed.) at 113-15, 382; Dicey, Introductionto the Study of the Law of the Constitution(10th ed., reprint 1885 ed., 1965)
at 406-408.
46
Supra note 33, at 3.
47
Id. at IV-V.
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The Committee expressed its wish in its Seventh Report that all of its
recommendations henceforth would be dealt with in the same way as the nine
recommendations contained in its Sixth Report: that is, they must be approved
and, by Order, adopted by the Legislature. Since the Committee's Sixth
Report, the Government has generally been receptive to the recommendations
of the Committee. For example, of the six recommendations in the Eighth
Report of the Committee, five were accepted by the Government. 48
VIII. THE COMMITTEE'S RULE-MAKING ROLE
Mention has previously been made of the rule-formulating term of
reference granted to the Committee by the Legislature. The Committee's
broad interpretation of its rule-formulating mandate has largely been responsible for a deterioration in the relationship between the Ombudsman and the
Select Committee.
In December of 1976, the Committee's first Chairman, Mr. Renwick,
wrote to all M.P.P.'s, requesting that they each provide the Committee with
their comments and observations on the role and operations of the Office of
the Ombudsman. Sixteen of the Legislature's 125 members replied, either in
writing or in person, to the Committee. The Committee commented in its Second Report, tabled in March, 1977, that it considered it necessary to review
and report to the Legislature on the operation of the Office of the Ombudsman internally, and with respect to its working relationship with various
governmental organizations and the Legislative Assembly. From the Committee's vantage point, the purpose of the inquiry was, in part, to determine
whether the formulation of any rules for the guidance of the Ombudsman in
the exercise of his functions was appropriate at the time.
In its Second Report, the Committee described its role in the following
terms:
The relationship that exists between the Ombudsman and the Legislature requires
a Select Committee of this nature with authority and flexibility to deal, on a
continuing basis, with matters affecting the Ombudsman such as reports, rules for
his guidance in the performance of his functions under the Act and any other matter arising which is within its order of reference ....
The Committee should have
and continue to have an identity of its own to deal with the unique matters
that
49
arise from the consequence of the operation of the Ombudsman's office.
4'The exception being Recommendation 6, supra note 34, at 55. As previously
mentioned, the Government rejected the Committee's recommendation having received
two legal opinions which disagreed with the interpretation placed by both the Ombudsman and the Committee upon the interpretation of s. 42(1) of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 539. The Committee expressed its view that such a
decision by the Assembly to reject a Committee recommendation:
should only be taken in exceptional circumstances and only when, after a full
debate has occurred, the Legislature is able to conclude that the implementation of
the Committee's recommendation would, in the circumstances, be contrary to the
public interest or be contrary to some generally recognized principle of law.
Supra note 21, at 2. The Committee also stated that:
If a situation were permitted to develop whereby rejection of such Committee
recommendation were the norm, or were made for some capricious reason, the
Ombudsman's effectiveness in the eyes of the governmental organizations and the
people of the Province of Ontario would be irreparably harmed. Id. at 3.
49
Supra note 27, at 48.
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As mentioned earlier in this paper, the Committee's Second Report included a number of recommendations directed to the Ombudsman respecting
the administration of his office. In his Second Report, Mr. Maloney termed
50
these recommendations "important" and "helpful."
The Committee again conducted a review of the internal operation of the
Office of the Ombudsman during the summer of 1977. In its Third Report,
tabled in late November, 1977, the Committee expressed its opinion that it was
necessary for it to begin the formulation of certain general rules.
The Committee outlined ten areas wherein it was considering such rules.
Its stated purpose in doing so was two-fold: first, to give the Ombudsman an
opportunity to consider the Committee's comments, and for him to provide
whatever comments he thought were appropriate to assist the Committee in its
deliberations, and second, to inform each member of the Legislature of the
areas in which the Committee was considering general rules and to invite their
comments. These areas ranged from "preliminary investigations" by the Ombudsman's office, to the Ombudsman's report and recommendations pursuant
to section 22(3) of the Act. 51
In August, 1978, the Committee fowarded to each member of the
Legislature a letter referring to the areas included in the Committee's Third
Report and inviting Members' comments. The Committee received seventeen
replies, including thirteen from Cabinet Ministers. The members who responded to the Committee's letter generally supported the formulation of general
rules.
During the Committee's sittings in the summer of 1978, it reviewed the
matter of general rules with Mr. Maloney, and settled upon a more comprehensive list of areas wherein rules were considered to be appropriate. Mr.
Maloney advised the Committee that, in his opinion, the majority of areas
considered by the Committee did not require general rules because the matter
was already sufficiently covered either by the Ombudsman Act or by procedures instituted in the Ombudsman's office in response to the Committee's
Third Report. Mr. Maloney also submitted that certain other areas were more
properly the subject matter of legislative amendment, as opposed to legislative
reform.
Mr. Maloney's protestations notwithstanding, in its Fifth Report tabled
on November 9, 1978, the Committee expressed its opinion that some of the
areas required the immediate formulation of general rules, even in the event of
amendments to the Ombudsman Act. The Committee accordingly recommended the formulation of general rules in these areas, expressing its hope that
it would, with the benefit of the views of the Members of the Assembly, to be
expressed during the debate of the Fifth Report, formulate the general rules
and submit them for adoption by the Assembly.
The Committee recommended
52
that nine general rules be formulated.
It should be mentioned that on August 15, 1978, the Committee Chairman had received a copy of a letter, bearing the same date, from Mr. Maloney
50

SecondAnnual Report of the Ombudsman, 1976-1977at 40.

51Supranote 29, at 31-42.
52

Supra note 32, at 83-91.
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to the Premier advising him of Mr. Maloney's intention to tender his resignation on October 9, 1978. Following Mr. Maloney's resignation, Keith Hoilett,
the Ombudsman's Executive Director, was appointed Temporary Ombudsman until the Honourable Donald R. Morand assumed office on January 23,
1979.
In June of 1979, the Committee considered the issue of the appropriateness of the rules with the new Ombudsman. Mr. Morand expressed
his agreement with Mr. Maloney that the rules contemplated by the Select
Committee did not appear to be necessary. The Committee disagreed and, in
its Seventh Report, tabled in September of 1979, formulated six general rules
which it recommended for approval and adoption by the Legislature. 53 On
November 27, 1979, the Committee of the Whole House recommended the
adoption of the amended Seventh Report of the Select Committee on the Ombudsman, including the six rules formulated by the Committee, and it was
54
ordered that the amended Report be received and adopted.
By letter dated December 20, 1979, Mr. Morand advised the Committee
Chairman, Mr. Lawlor, that:
[E]very member of my staff has been provided with photocopies of the relevant
pages of the Votes and Proceedings ....and have been instructed by memorandum that they are required to adhere to the rules which the Assembly has now
made under section 16 of the Ombudsman Act. As the Committee notes at page
30, the Office has without exception, been complying for some time now with the
matters set forth in that part of the Committee's report.
Mr. Morand proceeded in his letter to state that he still foresaw problems
with the rule requiring notice to be given under section 19(3) of the Act. 55
Simply stated, Mr. Morand's concern was that section 19(3) of the Act imposed a higher standard than that set forth in the rule, 56 in that a person or
governmental organization may be adversely affected by the Ombudsman's
report, even where the Ombudsman's opinion under section 22 falls short of
having, "the effect of altering, opposing or causing the original decision,
53
Supra note
54

33, at 29-36.
Ont. Legis. Ass., Votes andProceedingsNo. 99 (Nov. 27, 1979) at 391-94.
55Section 19(3). The Ombudsman may hear or obtain information from such persons as he thinks fit, and may make such inquiries as he thinks fit and it is not necessary
for the Ombudsman to hold any hearing and no person is entitled as of right to be heard
by the Ombudsman, but, if at any time during the course of an investigation, it appears
to the Ombudsman that there may be sufficient grounds for his making any report or
recommendation that may adversely affect any governmental organization or person,
he shall give to that organization or person an opportunity to make respresentations
respecting
the adverse report or recommendation, either personally or by counsel.
56
Regulation 697, R.R.O. 1980, Rule 6. The Committee concurs in the recommendation where at any time during the course of an investigation it appears to the Ombudsman that there may be sufficient grounds for formulating opinions under subsections 22(1) and (2) of the Ombudsman Act or of making any recommendations under
subsection 22(3) of the Ombudsman Act, which has the effect of altering, opposing or
causing the original decision, recommendation, act or omission to be changed in any
way, the Ombudsman shall give the governmental organization and any person who is
identified or is capable of being identified as having made or committed or caused to be
made or committed, as the case may be, the decision, recommendation, act or omission,
and opportunity to make representations respecting the adverse report or recommendations either personally or by counsel.
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recommendation, act or omission to be changed.

. . ,,57 Mr. Morand advised
that he would continue to be guided by the Act in such cases, and would afford
an opportunity to parties adversely affected to make representations.

During the sittings of the Committee in the summer of 1978, Mr. Maloney
referred the Committee to a number of substantial amendments to The Ombudsman Act, 1975, that Mr. Maloney considered to be necessary. The Committee agreed in its Fifth Report5 8 that certain amendments were necessary,
and suggested that the Ombudsman incorporate his proposed amendments in
the form of a report to be tabled with the Speaker of the Assembly, with a request that the Speaker refer it to the appropriate persons for consideration and
implementation. The Committee recommended that the Speaker, upon receiving the Ombudsman's report, refer it to the Committee for consideration and
report to the Legislature.5 9
Since Mr. Morand determined that he lacked the authority to make the
kind of report contemplated by the Committee, in January, 1981, he provided
the Attorney General with a draft bill to amend the Ombudsman Act, and with
a draft policy submission in support of the bill. Mr. Morand notified the Committee during its September, 1981 sittings of his actions in this regard, and that
he had not as yet received any formal response from the Attorney General or
Cabinet. 60
Mr. Morand declined the Committee's request to provide it with a copy of
either the bill or policy submission at the time, since he felt this might prejudice any discussions with representatives of the Ministry of the Attorney
General. In its Ninth Report, the Committee expressed its displeasure with the
Ombudsman in this regard, and recommended, "that any legislation tabled in
the Legislature amending or otherwise dealing with the Ombudsman Act be
referred for consideration, after second reading, to the Select Committee on
the Ombudsman." 61
Given the Select Committee's wide interpretation of its rule-making mandate, it was perhaps inevitable that a rift would develop in the relationship between the Committee and the Ombudsman. The stage was set when the Committee decided in March of 1977 that it had the authority to deal, and would
proceed to deal, with a complaint to the Committee from an M.P.P. The complaint alleged that a member of the Ombudsman's staff had appeared on two
cable television programmes with a nominated and opposing candidate in the
Member's riding.
The Chairman of the Select Committee at the time, Mr. Renwick, advised
Mr. Maloney during the Committee sittings on March 14, 1977, that he had
confirmed with Committee counsel that, in light of the Committee's ruleformulating term of reference, the Committee had authority to deal with the
Member's complaint.
57

Supranote 33, at 34-35.
Supranote 32, at 91-92.
59 Recommendation 51, id. at 92.
60 This remains the situation today.
61Recommendation 8, supra note 21, at 39.
58
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Mr. Maloney expressed his view that the Member's complaint was,
"totally outside the terms of reference of the Committee and the Ombudsman
did not accept the jurisdiction of the Committee relating to [the Member's]
complaint. Mr. Maloney would not authorize any member of the Ombudsman's staff to participate in a discussion." 62 Mr. Maloney indicated to the
Committee that he had advised the Member that an internal investigation had
been commenced, and would inform the Member of the results. In the event
that the Member was dissatisfied, he could ask the Speaker to refer the matter
to the Procedural Affairs Committee.
In response to Mr. Renwick's request for a written submission addressing
the matter of the Committee's jurisdiction to consider this issue, Mr. Maloney
wrote an eight page letter dated March 18, 1977.63 In the letter, Mr. Maloney
amplified his position that the rule-formulating mandate of the Committee
was confined to the exercise by the Ombudsman of his functions under the
Ombudsman Act. While such rules may relate to the investigating and reporting functions of the Ombudsman, they clearly do not extend to matters of
employment as between the Ombudsman and a staff member.64
Mr. Maloney set forth his view that, were the Committee to consider the
Member's complaint, it would compromise the independence of the Ombudsman and his freedom from political interference. He asserted that the
Ombudsman must remain free from the control of any body, with the exception of the Legislature, which alone has the responsibility to dismiss him for
cause.
When the Committee reconvened on March 22, 1977, Mr. Maloney had
not received a reply to his letter. Mr. Renwick proceeded to ask the Member to
outline his complaint, expressing the hope that Mr. Maloney would stay to
hear and comment. Mr. Maloney reiterated his view that the matter complained of fell beyond the Committee's jurisdiction, and that he would be open to
serious criticism were he to stay. He advised that he had investigated the
Member's complaint, taken remedial action, and advised the Member to that
effect. Despite the entreaties of the Committee members that Mr. Maloney remain, the Ombudsman withdrew with the members of his staff from the Committee room. 65
Mr. Maloney's actions in retiring from the Committee chamber sent
shock waves throughout the Assembly. The First Clerk of the House, Mr.
John Holtby, commented that, "that just wasn't done." After recounting its
version of the incident, the Committee observed as follows in its Second
Report.
The committee regrets the conduct of the Ombudsman in walking out of the Committee's meeting, although requested by the Committee to remain. This was an illadvised act displaying an unfortunate attitude and a misunderstanding of the role
of this Committee and its obligations to report to the Assembly.
62

at 27.63

Select Committee on the Ombudsman, Minutes of Proceedings(March 14, 1977)

The letter appears in Maloney, Blueprintfor the Office of the Ombudsman in
Ontario, sent to the Premier on March 29, 1979, at 578-85.
64Section 8 of the Ombudsman Act empowers the Ombudsman to employ such officers and employees as he considers necessary, and to determine their salary, remuneration, 65
and terms and conditions of employment.
Supra note 62, March 27, 1977 at 11-12.
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In the opinion of the Committee there must be an on-going relationship based
on mutual respect and understanding between the Ombudsman and the Committee. In order to achieve this respect and understanding, the Committee chooses not
to comment at length upon this incident or to make any recommendation about it.
The Committee hopes it will not occur again. 66
Possibly in the spirit of reconciliation, Mr. Maloney decided not to refer to the
incident in his annual report. Unfortunately, such a reconciliation never took
place. In fact, Mr. Maloney was greatly disturbed at the ensuing deterioration
in his relationship with the Committee.
In March of 1979, five months after his resignation, Mr. Maloney sent the
Premier his Blueprintfor the Office of the Ombudsman in Ontario. While the
aforementioned incident concerning the member may have escaped mention in
Mr. Maloney's Annual Reports, such was not the case with his Blueprint.
Before referring in detail to the events, Mr. Maloney commented as follows:
The Committee's mandate is clear and unambiguous. I reiterate that operating
within that mandate and in close cooperation with the Ombudsman the Committee
could have augmented inestimably the effectiveness of the Ombudsman's office.
There is the potential in this structure for a partnership between the Ombudsman
and the Select Committee combining a capacity to investigate and point up injustice to the individual with an ability to carry forward recommendations to rectify these injustices to the very floor of the Legislature.
Unfortunately, such a partnership has never developed. Instead an arm's length
adversarial relationship grew up between the Committee and the Ombudsman's
office. The Ombudsman's direction regarding those areas in which the Committee
could be of real assistance was never sought. An atmosphere of hostility pervaded
the Committee's meetings with members of the Ombudsman's staff. A stringent,
legalistic interpretation of the legislation was urged upon the Ombudsman by the
Committee which interpretation, if followed, would render the Ombudsman's job
virtually impossible. Most seriously, however, the Committee chose to ignore the
limitations of its mandate and attempted to exercise control over the administration of the Ombudsman's office itself. 67
Interestingly enough, despite Mr. Maloney's concern with the Select Committee's intrusion into the administration of his office, he concurred with the
Committee's recommendation, first made in its Second Report, that its Order
of Reference be expanded to enable it to consider the estimates of the Ombudsman and report to the Legislature. In this regard, he observed as follows:
An expansion of the Committee's mandate in these terms would underline the
necessity for the Committee to remain sensitive to the requirement of the absolute
independence of the Ombudsman's office. Control having political overtones or
the suggestion of such would be just as offensive as control by the executive or the
appearance of such. Certainly, if this jurisdiction were conferred upon the Select
Committee it would emphasize the need for a cessation of the hostility and the requirement
of a close partnership between the Ombudsman and the Select Commit68
tee.

Since June of 1976, the estimates of the Ombudsman have been considered by the Board of Internal Economy, with the Chairman of the Select
Committee on the Ombudsman in attendance to observe the preliminary examination. The Board considers the estimates of all legislative offices, including those of the auditor. It has been a matter of continuing frustration for
the Committee that, despite recommendations on four separate occasions that
66 Supra note 27, at 52-53.
67

68

Supra note 63, at 400-401.
Id. at 423.
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69
its terms of reference be extended to consider the Ombudsman's estimates,
and the comment in one report that the matter was one of "utmost priority,"
the House has, as yet, failed to amend the Order of Reference.
Unfortunately, it is painfully clear that the Committee continues to interpret its rule-formulating mandate as encompassing virtually any and every
facet of the administration and operation of the Ombudsman's office. As
recently as March 1982, the Chairman of the Committee requested the Ombudsman to provide the Committee with a copy of his budgetary submission to
the Board of Internal Economy along with salary and job description information for all of his employees. A further example of the absurdity resulting from
the Committee's interpretation of its rule-making mandate was the Committee's decision to consider the appropriateness of the Ombudsman attending an
Ombudsman seminar with expenses paid for and sponsored by the International Business Association. While a Select Committee cannot institute inquiries beyond its terms of reference, the interpretation of the 7Order
of
0
Reference of a Select Committee is a matter for the Committee itself.

One final item remains to be considered under this heading, namely communications from the public. Almost from the moment of the Committee's
establishment, it began receiving letters from members of the public who had
previously brought a complaint to the Ombudsman's office and were still
dissatisfied. While most of these complainants criticized the Ombudsman for
not supporting their cause, some expressed displeasure with the service received from the Ombudsman or members of his staff.
Although the Committee has indicated that it is not prepared to act as a
"Court of Appeal" from Ombudsman Reports, it decided that it would, in appropriate circumstances, hear from members of the public in person, when, in
the Committee's opinion, it would assist it in the formulation of general rules
for the guidance of the Ombudsman. 71
The Committee also determined that, as a matter of general policy, it
would not consider a complainant's concern before the Ombudsman had
issued a report or taken other appropriate steps under the Ombudsman Act; in
other words, the Committee was not prepared to hear 72"premature" complaints that were still undergoing the Ombudsman process.
When the Committee receives a letter from a former complainant of the
Ombudsman's office, the Clerk sends a copy to the Ombudsman's office. We
write to the complainant forthwith advising him that our office intends to cooperate fully with the Select Committee, and requesting that he execute an attached form of authorization. The letter further advises that the authorization
will enable us, notwithstanding our duty of confidentiality to the complainant,
to comply with any request by the Committee for copies of Reports or correspondence exchanged between the complainant and the Ombudsman's
office.
69

Recommendation 29, supra note 27, at 63; Recommendation 41, supra note 29,
at 99; Recommendation 52, supra note 32, at 140; Recommendation 7, supra note 21, at
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May, ParliamentaryPractice (18th ed.) at 620; Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra note 26, at 22.
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The Office's experience to date is that this procedure has worked out
satisfactorily, and rarely do the communications received by the Committee
contain anything which,
in its view, would have assisted it in its rule73
formulating function.
IX. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ONTARIO COMMITTEE'S VALUE TO
THE OMBUDSMAN AND TO THE PUBLIC GENERALLY
It is hopefully clear from the preceding pages that the Committee's relationship with the Ombudsman has, at times, been uneven and ambiguous.
Notwithstanding this history, however, both Mr. Maloney and Mr. Morand
remain of the view, "that a Select Committee can be a valuable adjunct to the
Ombudsman's office, provided, of course, each works closely with
the other at
74
the same time respecting their distinct spheres of responsibility."
The Committee provides an important sequel to the Ombudsman's investigation and report in "recommendation denied" cases. It has largely been
the experience of Ombudsmen in jurisdictions without such a committee that
the Ombudsman's report is not acted upon by the government after it is tabled
before the Speaker.
For example, the present New Brunswick Ombudsman, Judge Joseph
Berube, has said that:
The Ombudsman's annual report appears to be little read by individual members,
there is little or no comment on it in the proceedings of the Legislative Assembly. It
is the Executive, rather than the legislative branch, which has traditionally initiated
action on the Ombudsman's recommendations ....
The result is that while the
Ombudsman's role appears to complement that of the Legislature, there may be a
need for a greater consciousness
of this relationship, possibly through the creation
75
of a Select Committee.
One of the earliest proponents of the Ombudsman institution in Canada,
Professor Donald Rowat of Carleton University, agreed with Judge Berube:
I think that when the Ombudsmen make recommendations for legislative change,
that is, for amendment to the laws, for improvements in administrative procedure,
their recommendations are likely to fall on barren ground if there is no specific
committee of the Legislature ready to take up those proposals and recommend
them to the Legislature. I think that that is one of the main advantages
of having
76
the Select Committee on the Ombudsman on a continuing basis.
Dr. Graham White has attributed much of the tension in the relationship
between the Ontario Ombudsman and the Committee to the rudimentary fact
that the Ombudsman is doing a job that, rightly or wrongly, many M.P.P.'s
believe to be theirs. Given the limited resources with which they must tackle all
manner of problems, many Members are frankly jealous of the Ombudsman's

73 An exception was a communication that prompted the Committee to formulate
Rule 4(ii) prohibiting a member of the Ombudsman's staff from expressing opinions or
making comments respecting actions or omissions purported to have been committed by
the governmental organization in question, or respecting anything else arising out of the
Ombudsman's investigation.
74
Supra note 63, at 406. See also the Sixth Annual Report of the Ombudsman,
1978-1979 at 14, where Mr. Morand referred to the Committee "as the final arrow in
the Ombudsman's quiver."
75
N.B., Sixth Annual Report of the Ombudsman, 1978-1979 at 14.
76
CanadianLegislative Ombudsman ConferenceProceedings,1977 at 181.
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formidable resources. In this connection, the former leader of the Ontario
New Democratic Party, Mr. Stephen Lewis, has said that:
Number one, I think the problem in this jurisdiction and perhaps in others lies with
the legislators and not with the Ombudsman. I think that some of my colleagues
suffer palpable tremors about the intrusion on what was a sacred ground for the
legislators, and I suspect that this is a continuing anxiety in the evolution of the
Ombudsman's office. I don't know whether it's a fear which politicians have or
legislators have from time to time of having inadequacies exposed, or whether it's
a fear which77 emerges at least early on that may persist which to me frankly makes
little sense.
It is perhaps partly as a result of this rivalry that has yet to be resolved
that the kind of partnership envisaged by both Mr. Maloney and the legislators
when the Committee was established has never come to pass.
One should not be left with the impression that the Committee is continually at odds with the Ombudsman, for such is not the case. The relationship of the Committee with the Ombudsman has, for the most part, been
amicable and co-operative in recent years, the occasional differences in opinion notwithstanding. Sometimes that collaboration has achieved outstanding
results. For example, with the aid of the Select Committee, the Ombudsman
was able to assist the Workmen's Compensation Board in formulating a clear
policy of "benefit of78the doubt" which is now applied at all levels of decisionmaking at the Board.
While I have argued earlier that the Committee ought to afford a greater
degree of deference to the Ombudsman's opinion in a "recommendation
denied" case, it is also true that the Committee has an almost perfect record in
ensuring that the Ombudsman's recommendations are carried out when the
Committee has agreed with the Ombudsman, and so reported and recommended to the Legislature.
The following passage from the Committee's Sixth Report summarizes
the role that the Select Committee on the Ombudsman has attempted to
perform:
The Committee has historically functioned as more than an information source to
the Legislative Assembly respecting the organization and operation of the 'Ombudsman concept' in Ontario. It has served as a liaison and catalyst in the
establishment, maintenance and improvement of the relationships between the
Ombudsman and the many governmental organizations within his jurisdiction. It
has also served as a means of implementing matters outstanding between the office
of the Ombudsman and governmental organizations. It has been acknowledged by
most who have come into contact with it as an effective
7 9 instrument in the overall
concept of an Ombudsman in the Province of Ontario.
In his Blueprint, Mr. Maloney characterized his relationship with the
Committee as, "an unhealthy one [that] tends to inhibit rather than enhance
the Ombudsman function." 8 0 Since assuming office, Mr. Morand has attempted to do his best to ameliorate that relationship.

at 158.
See, supranote 33, at 27-29; supranote 21, at 29.
7
9Sixth Report, supra note 41, at III.
8
0Supra note 63, at 406.
7Id.
78
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Extensive reference was made earlier to what could be considered a major
stumbling block to a complete reconciliation between the Ombudsman's office
and the Committee, namely the Committee's overly generous interpretation of
its rule-formulating mandate. Unless the Committee is prepared to confine
itself to considering the appropriateness of rules for the guidance of the Ombudsman in his investigative and reporting functions, as opposed to such matters as the administration and organization of his office, it is likely that the
road ahead will remain a rocky one. Since the Committee continues to believe
that it is the appropriate legislative agency to consider virtually any matter
concerning the Ombudsman, the prognosis does not look good.
In conclusion, I can do no better than to repeat the observation made
by Professor Jack Richardson, Ombudsman for the Commonwealth of
Australia:
Although there are obvious dangers, as early Ontario experience shows, in having
a zealous Select Committee, the balance of opinion is clearly that select committees
have facilitated the work of the Ombudsman and promoted an alertness in Parliament to his role in exposing deficiencies in official action and seeking appropriate
remedies. In Sweden, Denmark,
Israel and Britain this is clearly so, and it appears
81
it may be so in Ontario.

81Richardson, J., "The Ombudsman among the State Authorities," International
Ombudsman Conference(Second) Proceedings(Jerusalem, 1980) at 60.

